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Why did the Austral plan fail to curb inflation on a sustained ba-
sis? Sophistication  in the design of a stabilization  program is no
substitute for addressing fundamental imbalances, contends the
author - and price controls, improperly used, can make the
problem worse.
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Mcocnomic  Adjustment
and  Growth
The Austral plan, launched in 1985, was Argen-  The authorities did not think through how to
tina's most recent stabilization strategy for  liberalize prices - when, how, and under what
reducing high inflation.  A heterodox program, it  condition to remove price controls - without
combined orthodox components - tiaht fiscal  bringing back inflation.
policy and monetary restraint - with iess
conventional wage and price controls.  The chief advantage of controls is also their
chief drawback.  They can quickly reduce
The Austral plan failed to bring inflation  inflation, leading authorities to underestimate
down on a sustained basis, but it provided useful  serious underlying imbalances. The repeated
lessons about the design of heterodox stabiliza-  use of controls works against stabilization:  an-
tion programs, the difficulties of sustaining this  ticipating freezes, firms set high prices.  Antici-
type of effort, and the consequences of failure.  pating re-imposition of controls, firms accelerate
price increases. Controls should be removed
Lesson 1, contends the author:  gradually, when si,plies  generally are in excess,
and tight fiscal and monetary policies should
Sophistication is no substitute for addressing  remain in place during "flexibilization."  This
fundamental imbalances. Sustained curbing of  was not done in Argentina.
inflation requires a long-term effort. Income
policies can help bring inflation down quickly,  In the Austral plan, the removal of controls
but must be accompanied by sustained monetary  coincided with a flexibilization in the manage-
and fiscal efforts.  Tight money cannot be  ment of the main anchors of the system. Grad-
sustained in the presence of a large fiscal imnbal-  ual decontrol of private prices followed by a
ance.  sequenced adjustment in wages, public sector
prices, and the exchange rate would have had a
Fiscal reform and a restructuring of public  better chance of success, the author argues.
sector enterprises were imperative, but were not
undertaken.  The removal of controls left the economy
with no nominal anchors - no nominal variable
Lesson 2:  to anchor the rate of inflation.  Given necessary
adjustments in prices and the exchange rate,
To be effective, price controls must be used  money should have played a more active role
cautiously and only temporarily. They should  and the authorities should have pursued a policy
gradually be removed when authorities see that  of untying devaluations from past inflation.
the underlying inertial forces have been sub-
dued.
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Enrique Szewach,  and Steve Webb.I. Introduction
Inflation  is  a chronic  feature  of the  Argentine  economy,  one  that  has
only  turned  worse  over  the  years  as inflation  rates  continuously  crept  up to
higher  and  higher  levels. Inflation  has survived  the  implementation  of
several  serious  and  comprehensive  stabilization  programs,  and  the  use  of
alternative  stabilization  strategies.  The  Austral  plan  was the  most  recent
of these  attempts.
There  were three  major  stabilization  effort  prior  to the  Austral. The
1959  stabilization  program  under  Frondizi  was launched  along  strict  orthodox
lines. It  was  based  on  monetary  and  fiscal  discipline,  and  a sharp
devaluation  of the  exchange  rate. The  program  succeeded  in bringing  down
inflation  quickly  (from  113  percent  in 1959  to  14 perceut  in 1961),  but  it
-was  not  able  to  maintain  it  at the  reduced  levels  for  a significant  pez-od.
An alternative  approach  was followved  in  1967,  under  Krieger  Vasena. This
program  combined  the  adjustment  in fundamentals  (namely  a reduction  in  the
fiscal  deficit)  with  an income  policies  package. It  was  also  successful  in
the  short  run,  and  achieved  price  stability  for  almost  three  years,  but
inflation  came  back  and  even  surpassed  previous  levels  in  the  early
seventies.  After  a short-lived  populist  stabilization  program  during  the
Peronist  government,  a third  serious  attempt  was launched  under  Martinez  de
Hoz.  That  program  started  along  orthodox  lines  (with  some  use  of income
policies),  but its  limited  success  in  reducing  inflation  prompted  a shift  in
strategy  with the  exchange  rate  playing  a  central  role  as a stabilization
instrument.  The future  path  of the  exchange  rate  was  preannounced  in  hopes
that  this  would  be an effective  anchor  to influence  expectations  and  bring
down  inflation. The  policy  was effective  in  bringing  down  inflation2
(temporarily)  at the  cost  of an overvaluation  of the  currency  and  severe
external  imbalances.  The  program  collapsed  in  1931,  and  infl'tion  moved  up
to an  even  higher  level.
Despite  the  dissimilarities  in the  design  of these  programs,  most of
them  were able  to strike  transitory  gains  in the  fight  against  inflation.
The  ultimate  outcomes,  however,  were  disappointingly  similar. The  programs
were eventually  abandoned  as  a result  of a deterioration  in  the  fiscal
situation  and  in the  balance  of p'yments,  and  inflation  returned  invigorated
reaching  even  higher  levels. 1 As can  be seen  in figure  1 there  has  been  a
close  relationship  between  deficits  (measured  as a  percent  of  GDP)  and
inflation  over  the  yeavs,  as  well as  a continuous  inability  to  bring  down  the
budget  deficit  on a permanent  basis. The  fiscal  cycles  are  an important
feature  of the  Argentine  economy;  they  have  become  a  burden  that  any  new
stabilization  program  will  have  to deal  with.
The  inflationary  developments  following  the  Martinez  de Hoz  era  were
complicated  by the  Qrumatic  and  continuous  deterioration  in the  internal  and
external  economic  conditions.  The  government  budget  deficit  got  out  of
control  during  the  last  years  of the  military  government,  exceeding  by some
estimates  20 percent  of GDP,  and  remained  basically  unaffected  during  the
first  two  years  of the  Alfonsin  administration.  On the  external  side,  the
situation  deteriorated  as a result  of  high interest  rates,  and  a continuous
fall  in the  terms  of trade. The  debt  crisis  made  matters  worse  as the
authorities  were forced  to finance  these  deficits  almiost  entirely  through
domestic  sources. This  is  reflected  by the  large  seigniorage  levels  (around
1  For  a  more  detailed  description  of  these  episodes  see  Kiguel  and  Liviatan
(1988)  and  de Pablo  and  Martinez  (1988).3
8 percent  of GDP)  that  were  prevalent  between  1982  and  1984.2
These  massive,  money  financed  budget  deficits  were  the  major  source
behind  the  relentless  acceleration  in inflation  from  100  percent  in  1981  to
over  1800  percent  during  the  second  quarter  of  1985. The  situation  was
unsustainable  and  in the  absence  of drastic  measures  the  economy  was on its
way to  hyperinflation.
The  Austral  plan,  launched  in  June  1985,  provided  a response  to this
crisis. It  was a stabilization  program  whose  main  objective  was  to pull  down
inflation  very  quickly  to  manageable  levels. Although  the  stated  purpose  was
more ambitious,  to restore  price  stability  and  eradicate  inflation  from  the
economy,  the  government  never  undertook  the  necessary  measures  to accomplish
this  goal.  It  was a  heterodox  program  in  the  sense  that  it  combined  orthodox
components,  namely  tight  fiscal  policy  and  monetary  restraint,  with the  less
conventional  instruments  of price  and  wage  controls. A new  currency  was
introduced,  the  Austral;  the  currency  was devalued  followed  by an exchange
rate  freeze;  and  the  effects  of the  unexpected  reduction  in  inflation  were
neutralized  through  a novel  mechanism  based  on  the  introduction  of a
conversion  table  for  existing  contracts  (the  *desagiol).
The  program  was initially  very  successful  in  stopping  inflation.
Inflation  fell  from  30  percent  in  June  to  3.1  percent  in  August,  when
measured  in  terms  of  consumer  prices,  while  the  reductions  were  even  more
impressive  in  terms  of  wholesale  prices  (See  table  1).  Unfortunately,  as
most stabilization  efforts  in  Argentina,  the  Austral  plan  alec  failed. After
2 Seigniorage  was measured  as the  changes  in  MI as a percentage  of GDP.
TIn  Argentina  Ml,  as opposed  to the  monetary  base,  is the  appropriate  monetary
aggregate  to  measure  seigniorage  because  the  central  bank remunerates  reserve
requirements  on time  and  other  interest  bearing  deposits.4  r
one  year  of relative  price  stability,  inflation  rose  again,  reaching  pre-
Austral  levels  in  1988.
The  behavior  of inflation  following  the  failure  of the  Austral  plan  has
been  different  from  previous  episodes. Inflation  did  not  exceed  pre-
stabilization  levels,  as in all  the  other  programs,  but it  became  more
volatile. As can  be noticed  from  figure  2, the  economy  underwent  conspicuous
inflation-stabilization  cycles  (in  October  87  and  August  88)  which  cannot  be
directly  linked  to fiscal  problems. In  addition,  the  country  was  on the
verge  of  hyperinflation  in  two  occasions  during  this  period  (see  figure  2)
although  the  deficit  and  seigniorage  did  not  return  to  pre-Austral  levels.
This  paper  examines  the  behavior  of inflation  and  other  relevant
macroeconomic  variables  since  the  beginning  of the  Austral  Plan.  It  provides
a  more  comprehensive  evaluation  of  the  program  than  in  the  existing
literature  since  it  analyzes,  within  a  unified  framework,  the  various  phases
of the  Plan.  In this  respect,  it  provides  a bzoader  perspective  of the
program  and its  evolution. Section  II  discusses  the  strategy  of  the  original
program  and  raises  policy  and  analytical  issues  regarding  its  implementation.
Section  III  traces  the  evolution  of the  program  with  particular  emphasis  on
the  inflation-stabilization  cycles  and  the  inflationary  outbursts. Section
IV concludes  with a discussion  of some  of the  policy  lessons  from  the
Argentine  experience  regarding  the  implementation  of the  so  called  heterodox
shocks.
II.  Strategy  and  Implementation  of  the  Austral  Plan
A. StrategyThe  Austral  plan  was a  heterodox  program  which  combined  orthodox
elements,  such  as fiscal  discipline  and  monetary  restraint,  with  price  an.t
wage  controls. The  basic  strategy,  discussed  in  more  detail  in  de  Pablo
(1987),  Canavese  and  Di Tella  (1988),  Frenkel  and  Fanelli  (1987),  Heyman
(1987),  and  Machinea  and  Fanelli  (1988'  among  others,  attempted  to provide  a
comprehensive  response  to the  large  exiR:ing  imbalances  in  public  finances
and  to  thot  inertial  elements  of the  inflationary  process. Orthodox  measures
alone  are  not sufficient  to bring  about  a  rapid  disinflation  process  in
chronic  high .nflation  countries,  such  as  Argentina,  where  inertial  forces
are  at  work.  Inflation  inertia  can  result  from  staggered  nominal  contracts,
backward  indexation  of  wages,  or from  lack  of credibility  about  the
sustainability  of government  disinfletion  policies. The  wage and  price
freeze  was seen  as the  appropriate  instrument  to  deal  with  this  problem.
The short  run  success  of  the  program  depended  heavily  on the  ability  to
find  rapid  ways of reducing  the  large  budget  deficit  and  to engineer  an
effective  strategy  for  dealing  with the  behavior  of  nominal  variables. Its
long  run  success  required  a  permanent  reduction  in the  budget  deficit  to  a
level  consistent  with the  target  of low  inflation  and  the  choice  of a  nominal
anchor  to  make this  objective  feasible.
There  seems  to be  wide  agreement  among  analysts  about  the  soundness  of
the  initial  strategy,  and  on its  great  effectiveness  for  bringing  down
inflation  quickly  without  large  costs. Indeed,  the  initial  policy  measures
as  well as the  overall  results  during  this  stage  share  many common  elements6
with the  more  successful  Israeli  stabilization  program  of July  1985.3  There
is iess  consensus  on the  reasons  that  led  to the  resurgence  of inflation
during  1986;  most  analysts  (e.g.  Broda  (1987),  Rodriguez  (1988))  blame  it  on
the  reappearance  of important  fiscal  imbalances,  while  others  think  that  it
was  caused  by problems  in  managing  nominal  variables,  particularly  wages,  in
a closed  economy  with imperfect  competition (Frenkel  and  Fanelli  (1987),
Canavesa  and  Di Tella  (1988)).
In the  remainder  of this  section  we will  analyze  these  issues  in
perspective.  We will  briefly  discuss  the  main  components  of the
stabilization  program,  address  potential  weaknesses  in the  original  design,
and  the  initial  results.
B. Implementation
The  analysis  will focus  on four  aspects:  fiscal  policy,  management  of
prices,  wages  and  the  exchange  rates,  monetary  policy,  and  monetary  reform
and  odesagio.
a)  Fiscal  Policy
At the  beginning  of the  program  the  authorities  accomplished  a
significant  adjustment  in  the  fiscal  accounts. There  was  a drastic  reduction
in  the  total  budget  deficit  from  11.9  percent  of  GDP  in the  first  two
quarters  of 1985,  to 1.8  percent  in  the  third  quarter  (Table  2).4  A closer
3 For a detailed  comparison  of the two  programs  see  3lejer  and  Liviatan
(1987).  Thait  paper  also  discusses  the similar  behavior  of macroeconomic
variables  during  the  early  stages  of  the  programs.
4  Due  to  lack  of  accurate  statisticb  on  public  sector  expenditures,  there
is no consensus  among  observers  about  the  exact  magnitude  of the size  of the
initial  fiscal  imbalance.  Nevertheless,  all  the  available  sources  indicate  that
there  was a significant  reduction  in the budget  deficit,  which was cut by
approximately  two  thirds  from  the  levels  prevailing  at the  beginning  of 1985.7
analysis,  however,  indicates  that  most  of this  reduction  was  of a  transitory
nature  and  was likely  to  evaporate  very  quickly  if  inflation  resurfaced.
Government  expendLture  was  basically  unaffected  by the  program,  although  some
adjustments  had  been  done  in  the  months  preceding  the  plan. Reductions  in
real  wages  in the  public  sector  and  in  public  investment  were  done  prior  to
the  Austral  plan,  particularly  during  the  second  half  of 1984  and  the  first
months  of 1985.
Changes  in  tax  revenues  were  the  major  force  behind  the  improvement  in
the  fiscal  accounts. The  four  main  elements  were an increase  in  trade  taxes,
higher  public  sector  prices,  the  introduction  of a  forced  savings  scheme
(which  was essentially  a disguised  tax),  and  improvements  in  tax  collections
resulting  from  the  reduction  in in-lation.  The  first  tax  was the  only  one
that  could  be expected  to increase  revenues  on a  permanent  basis,  although  it
was also  the  most  detrimental  for  an efficient  allocation  of resources,  since
it introduced  an  additional  anti-export  bias  at a time  when the  country  was
facing  very  serious  problems  on its  external  sector.
The  realignment  of  public  sector  prices  was largely  attained  prior  to
the  program. This  adjustment  was reinforced  on June  14th  when the
authorities  increased  them  by 23.6  percent. As a result  of these  measures,
relative  public  sector  prices  reached  at that  time  their  highest  real  value
in the  1980s  (see  table  1).  This  favorable  situation  was  not sustainable
because  public  sector  prices  were  part  of the  nominal  anchors  the  authorities
were  using  to control  the  general  price  level. If inflation  were  to
continue,  as it  in fact  did,  the  initial  cushion  in r^lative  prices  would  be
lost  weakening  the  budgetary  position  of the  public  sector  enterprises.
The  forced  savings  scheme,  was designed  as a once  and  for  all8
compulsory  loan  from  individuals  and  corporations  to the  government.  In
principle,  this  was  not  a tax,  since  the  government  had  to repay  that  loan.
Nevertheless,  at that  time,  it  was considered  as genuine  income  for  the
purpose  of  calculating  the  budget  deficit. In  practice,  it  did  work as a
tax,  because  the  government  ended  up  borrowing  at  a  very low  nominal  interest
rate  which  became  negative  with the  increases  in inflation  in later  years.
The  final  element  contributing  to the  increase  in  tax  revenues  was a
gain  in  efficiency  in  tax  collection  which,  paradoxically,  resulted  from  the
reduction  in inflation.  Because  most  taxes  are  paid  with  a  lag,  an inc-easo
in  the  rate  of inflation  erodes  the  real  value  of government  revenues  .
is  the  well  known  Olivera-Tanzi  effect). A  drastic  reduction  in the  rate  of
inflation  works  in  reverse,  resulting  in  an increase  in the  real  value  of tax
revenues. Thus,  the  initial  success  of the  Austral  plan  on the  inflation
side  provided  an important  support  for  the  consolidation  of the  fiscal
situation.
b) Prices,  Wages  and  Exchange  Rate  Policies
The  management  of  nominal  variables  was  a central  part  of the  program.
A  freeze  of  prices,  wages  and  the  exchange  rate  was introduced  to deal  with
the  inertial  aspects  of the  inflationary  process. The  authorities  realigned
relative  prices  in order  to avoid  distortions  during  the  freeze  and  to
provide  a  cushion  in  public  sector  prices  and  the  real  exchange  rate. The
duration  of the  freeze  was  not  made  explicit,  but  it  was clear  that  this  was
a transitory  measure  and  that  efforts  would  be  made to  avoid  clear
distortions  in  relative  prices  which  c  uald  have  a detrimental  impact  on the
allocation  of resources.
In  this  respect  the  strategy  was  sensible  and  very  similar  to the  more9
successful  Israeli  program 5. Nevertheless,  the  realignment-freeze  approach
has important  limitations  which  are  relevant  for  the  evaluation  of further
developments  and  the  interpretation  of the  later  resurgence  of inflation.
Regardless  of the  effort  rade  by the  authorities  they  cannot  realistically
expect  to  hit the  equilibrium  vector  of relative  prices  at the  time  of the
freeze. At best,  they  can  attempt  to  avoid  clear  imbalances  regarding  the
key government  controlled  prices  (i.e.  the  exchange  rate,  and  public  sector
prices  and  wagis). In this  respect,  past  information,  though  useful,  might
not  be very relevant. Equilibr.am  relative  prices  change  over  time  in
response  to new  developments  in  the  domestic  and  international  markets,  and
these  changes  are  likely  to be  very  drastic  as the  economy  moves  from  high  to
low  inflation. 6 A  second  difficulty  arises  because  the  government  cannot
realign  every  price  in the  economy. For  the  private  sector  the  approach  was
to freeze  prices  according  to the  levels  prevailing  at a given  date (June
13th  in  the  case  of the  Austral),  without  any  realignments.  However,  due  to
staggering  of  nominal  contracts,  the  economy  will  have  a adisequilibrium'
structure  of relative  prices  at any  point  in time. In  Argentina,  as  well as
in Israel,  the  extent  of this  problem  was somewhat  reduced  because  there  was
S The  similarities  are  spelled  out in  more  detail  in  Blejer  and  Liviatan
(1987).
6  Two  important  factors  that  influence  prices  are  credit  terms  and  the  use
of financial  pespurces.  Firms  that  provide  interest  free  commercial  credit  to
their  customers  have  to include  their  financial  costs  in  the  price  they  charge.
If there  is  a  fall  in  inflation,  firms  should  react  by reducing  nominal  prices,
the  size  of the reduction  required  will depend  on the  average  length  of these
credits. A change  in relative  prices  will  occur  when there  are  differences  in
the  duration  of these  commercial  credit  lines  provided  by the  various  sectors.
On the  cost  side,  there  are  likely  to  be changes  in  the  cost structure  because
as the economy  moves to low inflation  firms  will increase  the proportion  of
resources  that  they  use in  production  and  reduce  those  use  to  manage  financial
assets.10
a significant  acceleration  in inflation  prior  to the  program  which  reduced
the  duration  of  nominal  contracts  hence  increasing  the  synchronization  of
price  decisions. 7
The  freeze-realignment  approach  implicitly  acknowledged  that  inflation
would  persist,  though  at a lower  level. There  was  an initial  overshooting  of
the  exchange  rate  (which  was devalued  by 15 percent  in  addition  of the  large
devaluations  prior  to the  program)  and  public  sector  prices. This  over-
adjustment  was  necessary  to  maintain  the  nominal  values  of these  variables
frozen  in  the  presence  of inflation.  In the  absence  of these  measures,  the
country  would  h'ave  faced  a  severe  overvaluation  of  its  currency  as  well  as a
deterioration  in  the  fiscal  accounts.
A different  approach  was adopted  for  wages,  a third  anchor  to the
system. Initial  restraint  in  nominal  wage increases  resulted  in  a reduction
in real  wages,  specially  in  the  public  sector, 8 which  were important  to
support  the  fiscal  effort  and  restraint  demand. This,  however,  was the  first
variable  to be flexibilized,  and  its  role  as anchor  was  probably  weaker
because  private  sector  wages  continued  to grow  during  the  freeze.
The  final  anchor  were industrial  prices 9 which  were  subjected  to direct
controls. The  freeze  was effective  at the  wholesale  level  (rather  than  at
the  retail  level),  a feature  that  explains  the  dissimilarities  in  behavior
On this  point  see  Pazos  (1972).
8  The  government  raised  nominal  wages  by  22.6  percent  effective  at  the  end
of June.  This increase,  however,  was not enough to compensate  for past
inflation  and  was certainly  smaller  than  the  accumulated  devaluation  of recent
months.
9 The  freeze  did  not apply  to goods  with seasonal  supplies  (mainly  meat,
fruits  and  vegetables)  which  were  instead  subject  to  fixed  mark-ups  over  costs.11
between  the  CPI  and  the  WPI  during  the  early  period.
In summary,  the  exchange  rate  and  public  sector  prices  were the  main
nominal  anchors  of the  system,  and  they  were  supported  by price  and  wage
controls. The  initial  realignment  in  relative  prices,  by providing  a  cushion
to the  two  main  anchors,  increased  the  likelihood  of success  of the  strategy.
c)  Monetary  Policy
The  management  of  monetary  policy  and  interest  rates  during  the  early
stages  of a stabilization  program  is  a  very delicate  and  difficult  matter.
The  problem  is specially  difficult  in  those  programs  that  are  successful  and
achieve  a rapid  reduction  in inflation.  In  many  cases,  however,  interest
rates  have  been  slow  to respond  to the  changes  in  inflation,  leading  to a
drastic  increase  in real  interest  rates. Two  main reasons  have  been  provided
to explain  this  downward  rigidity  in  nominal  interest  rates:  first,  it  could
result  from  the  adoption  of  a very  restrictive  monetary  policy  by the  central
bank,  and second  it  could  be the  effect  of lack  of credibility  regarding  the
sustainability  of  nominal  variables.
The  discussion  can  be clarified  with  the  help  of the  following  set  of
equations;
(1)  m  MHIP
(2)  i - r  +  we
(3)  m - L(r_+  Y')  LI  <  0.
Equation  (1)  is the  definition  of real  money  balances,  where  H is  the
money  supply  and  P is the  price  level. Equation  (2)  states  that  the  nominal
interest  rate (i)  is equal  to the  real  interest  rate (r)  plus  the  expected12
rate  of inflation  (we). Finally,  equation  (3)  states  the  equilibrium
conditions  for  the  money  market. This  Aquation  implies  that  there  is  an
inverse  relationship  between  real  money  holdings  and  the  nominal  interest
rate. 10
As long  as the  money  market  remains  in  equilibrium  low  (high)  real
money  balances  will  be associated  with  high (low)  nominal  interest  rates.
Empirically,  however,  it  is  difficult  to establish  whether  interest  rates
remain  high  because  money  is tight,  or if  instead  real  money  balances  stay  at
low  levels  because  the  equilibrium  nominal  interest  rate  continues  to  be
high.
Those  who consider  that  interest  rates  are  high  due  to  tight  money
(e.g.  Dornbusch  (1986)),  argue  that  the  equilibrium,  real  interest  rate  is
determined  in  the real  sector  and  assume  that  inflation  expectations  react
quickly  to  new  developments  (fe  falls  almost  immediately  after  the
implementation  of the  stabilization  program). Tight  monetary  policy  is
responsible  for  the  stickiness  in  nominal  interest  rates.
If  prices  were fully  flexible  in  both  directions,  an increase  (a
reduction)  in real  money  balances  could  be effected  through  a reduction  (an
increase)  in  the  price  level. In such  a  world,  tight  money  would  not  be an
obstacle  for  a fall  in  interest  rates. This  is  not,  however,  a relevant  case
since  in  general  there  is  downward  inflexibility  of prices. Nevertheless,
there  are in  prastice  varioas  mechanisms  that  could  allow  an increase  in  the
narrow  monetary  aggregates.  Agents  could  adjust  their  domestic  portfolios
10 Under  perfect  capital  mobility  the domestic  interest  rate  will equal
the  foreign  interest  rate  plus  the  expected  rate  of  depreciation  of  the  exchange.
For  the  purposes  of our  discussion,  however,  the  results  can  be derived  either
by using  equation  (2)  or the  perfect  capital  mobility  condition.13
and  increase  the  stock  of Ml relative  to other  financial  assets. In
addition,  portfolios  could  be adjusted  through  international  financial  flows.
If interest  rates  are  high,  there  would  be  capital  inflows  increasing  the
supply  of domestic  assets.
The  alternative  explanation  assumes  that  there  is stickiness  in
inflationary  expectations  (e.g.  Sachs  (1986)). Individuals  do  not  believe
that  the  program  is  going  to last  (we  remains  high),  hence,  according  to
equation  (2),  interest  rates  also  remain  high.  Low  real  money  balances  are
the  result  of  high interest  rates. To the  extent  that  the rate  of inflation
(f) falls,  w  <  we  and  ex-post  real  interest  rates  will  be high. However,
according  to this  view,  ex-ante  real  interest  rates  are  not  necessarily
high.
A mistake  in the  diagnosis  of the  causes  for  high interest  rates  will
be costly  for  the  economy. If the  government  wrongly  thinks  that  interest
rates  are  high  as a result  of tight  money  and  tries  to deal  with this  problem
by increasing  domestic  credit,  it  will create  an  excess  supply  of  money  and
in  the  end  destabilize  the  anti-inflation  process. If on the  other  hand it
errs  by using  tight  money  and  hence  allowing  real  interest  rates  to remain
high it  will decrease  investment,  and  possibly  worsen  the fiscal  accournts.
Since  an accurate  diagnosis  is in  practice  very  difficult,  the
government  has to  choose  which  alternative  is less  risky  given  its  own
priorities.  _If its  main goal  is  to succeed  in  bringing  down  inflation,  then
it is safer  to err  on the  side  of  high real  interest  rates  than  on the  side
of excess  demand  pressures  in the  goods  market. In countries  such  as
Argentina  a short  period  of  high  real  interest  rates  is  a price  worth  paying
if that  would  could  insure  low  inflation  in the  longer  term.14
The  available  evidence  indicates  that  the  authorities  followed  a
prudent  approach  at the  outset  of the  program. There  was a large  increase  in
domestic  credit  (and  in the  money  supply)  prior  to  the  program  and  during  its
first  weeks,  which  contributed  to  the  sharp  reduction  in  monthly  nominal
interest  rates  from  30 to  6 percent  (see  table  1).  The  initial  monetary
expansion  primarily  accommodated  the  increase  in  money  demand  resulting  from
the  reduction  in  the  opportunity  cost  of  holding  money  in a low  inflation
environment.  Despite  its  size,  it  did  not  create  an excess  supply  of  money
as illustrated  by the  capital  inflows  that  entered  the  country  during  the
first  two  weeks  of the  program  (estimated  in  USs 300  million). 11 In fact,  a
policy  of easy  money  would  have led  to  capital  outflows. The  overall
evidence  indicates  that  the  government  followed  a reasonable  monetary  policy
during  the  very  early  stages  of the  program. However,  as  will be discussed
later,  monetary  policy  remained  sound  only  for  a  very  short  span.
Money  did  not  play  a central  role  as  a nominal  anchor  in  the  program.
Even  in the  early  stages,  in  spite  of the  high  ex-post  real  interest  rates,
most analysts  consider  that  monetary  policy  was  primarily  accommodating. 12
Although  there  were a few  instances  in  which  the  authorities  followed  a
policy  of tight  money,  they  were relatively  short  lived  and  were  abandoned
once it  was apparent  that  the  consequence  was  a  long  period  of  high  real
interest  rates.
d)  Monetary  Reform  and 'Desagio
Two  interrelated  elements  of the  program  were the  monetary  reform,  and
11  After  that  time  capital  flows  slowed  down  mainly  because  the  government
imposed  additional  restrictions  on  capital  movements.
12 See  for  example  Heyman  (1987)  and  Frenkel  and  Fanelli  (1987).15
the  desagio,  an ingenious  scale  of  conversion  aimed  at  minimizing  the
transfero  between  borrowers  and  lenders  that  would  result  from  an
unanticipated  sharp  reduction  in  the  rate  of inflation.
The  monetary  reform  consisted  in  the  introduction  of a new  currency,
the  Austral. One  Austral  was  equivalent  to 1,000  units  of the  old  currency
(the  peso). Monetary  reforms  of this  type  had  been  done  twice  before  (in
1970  and  1983),  and  in  both  cases  they  only  meant  a change  in  numeraire  and
had  no effects  on inflation  or  expectations.
The  monetary  reform  in the  Austral  differed  in  two  ways.  First,  the
new  currency  was introduced  as  part  of  a comprehensive  stabilization  package.
Although  the  Austral  was fiat  money  and  was  not backed  by any  real  assets,
its  introduction  was accompanied  by an  announcement  not  to  print  any  more
money  to finance  the  budget  deficit. This  promise,  if  fulfilled,  was
specially  important  since  there  was a  wide (and  well founded)  perception  at
the  time  that  central  bank  financing  of the  deficit  was at the  core  of the
inflationary  process. Second,  and  more important,  the  new  currency  was
necessary  on legal  grounds  to  make the  desagio  possible. 13
A rapid  and  unanticipated  reduction  in  inflation  will,  in  general,
redistribute  income  (and  wealth)  from  debtors  to creditors.  At times  when
inflation  is  high,  nominal  interest  rates  also  tend  to  be  high in  order  to
maintain  a  constant  real  interest  rate. In  high inflation  economies,  changes
in  nominal  interest  rates  are  primarily  determined  by changes  in  the  expected
rate  of inflation.  When  the  Austral  plan  was launched,  inflation  and
interest  rates  were close  to  30  percent  per  month.  These  interest  rates  were
13  I  am  grateful  to  Enrique  Szewach  for  pointing  out  the  legal  difficulties
for  the  implementing  of the  desagio  in the  absence  of  a new  currency.16
based  on the  assumption  that  inflation  would  remain  at those  levels  in  the
near  future.
The  sharp  disinflation  accomplished  by the  Austral  plan  was an
unforseen  event  for  lenders  and  borrowers. Nominal  interest  rates  contracted
prior  to  the  plan  would  have  resulted  ir.  extraordinary  high ex-post  real
interest  rates  (close  to 20  percent  per  month). To avoid  these  effects  the
government  introduced  a  mechanism  (the  adesagio')  that  converted  the  value  of
financial  agreements  originating  prior  to June  14  with  maturities  after  that
date  according  to a  predetermined  rule. This  was  effected  through  the
introduction  of a scale  of conversion  from  Pesos  into  Australes  for  those
financial  obligations  maturing  after  June 14.  This  mechanism  was
particularly  important  for  the  public  sector  (including  the  central  bank)
whicr.  was a  net  debtor. 14 It is  conceivable  that  in  the  absence  of the
Odesagiol  the  budget  deficit  could  have  been  1 or 2  percentage  points  higher
than  it  actually  was during  the  first  months  of the  program.
C. Initial  Results
By and  large  this  was  a  well  designed  program  to  combat  inflation.  It
showed  an appropriate  balance  between  orthodox  and  heterodox  measures  that
are  necessary  to stabilize  quickly  and  without  large  social  costs. The  main
potential  problems  for  the  success  of the  plan  were  on the  fiscal  side,  where
the  adjustment,  although  significant,  was largely  based  on short  term
measures  and  hence  was  extremely  fragile,  and  on the  viability  of the
ezchange  rate  freeze  given  the  limited  access  to foreign  borrowing  as  a
14  Most of  the  public  sector  domestic  debt  was in  the  form  of deposits  of
commercial  banks  in  the  central  bank  and  other  types  of 'forced"  lending  through
the banking  system. A  comprehensive  study  of these  aspects  will be done  in
future  research.17
result  of the  debt  crisis. Sustainability  of the  program  required  that  the
authorities  would  introduce  very  quickly  a  major  fiscal  reform  aimed  at
improving  government  revenues  on a permanent  basis,  and  that  they  could
maintain  inflation  at low  levels  in  order  to avoid  overvalutation  of the
currency.
The  initial  results  were  very impressive,  but  similar  to  other  programs
based  on economy-wide  controls.  Inflation  fell  from  348  percent  per semester
in  the  first  half of  the  year  to 20.2  percent  in  the  second  half.  The
adoption  of price  controls  was  very  important  for  the  sharp  disinflation,
although  their  exact  role  in the  stabilization  effort  remains  unclear. The
government  did  not  develop  any  enforcement  mechanisms  to check  compliance
with  price  regulations,  so  the  reduction  in inflation  was  mainly  due  to
'voluntary"  compliance  by the  private  sector. In addition,  the  controls  did
not  produce  excess  demands  and  hence  shortages  in  most  markets. The  initial
success  was enhanced  by an improvement  during  the  third  quarter  in  the
current  account  of the  balance  of  payments,  and  only  a small  reduction  in the
level  of  economic  activity  (see  table  3).
Despite  the  aura  of success  some  worrying  signs  started  to  develop  in
the  fourth  quarter. While  inflation  remained  at relatively  low  levels  (at
2.5  percent  per  month),  the  current  account  turned  into  deficit  and  the
economy  moved  very  quickly  into  an expansionary  cycle,  mainly  propelled  by a
consumption  boom (table  3).  These  events  were  troubling  since  an increase  in
demand can  weaken  the  anti-inflation  effort  while  the  deterioration  in  the
balance  of payments  was likely  to reduce  the  ability  to  maintain  the  fixed
exchange  rate,  hence  lessening  the  credibility  of the  program.
The  evolution  of  nominal  variables  made it  clear  that  inflation  was18
going  to stay,  though  very  likely  at  much lower  levels. As can  be noticed  in
table  1,  money  supply  continued  growing  throughout  the  year. After  the
initial  large  increase  to satisfy  the  increase  in  the  demand  for  money,  Ml
and  M4 expanded  respectively  64  and  50  percent  between  August  and  December  of
1985. Although  part  of this  expansion  was certainly  absorbed  by increases  in
the  demand  for  money,  its  size  was incompatible  with an objective  of zero
inflation  and  it  undermined  the  credibility  of the  program. 15
In addition,  the  persistence  of inflation,  even  at the  much  lower
levels,  and  the  wage increases  granted  by the  private  sector  and  public
enterprises  created  problems  for  the  sustainability  of  the  freeze  of the
exchange  rate  and  prices  of  public  sector  enterprises.  The  initial  cushion
was slowly  being  eroded  and  it  was  becoming  increasingly  apparent  that  there
was  a need  to change  the  rules  for  the  nominal  anchors  and  to design  a
strategy  to get  out  of the  freeze.
III.  The  Stop  and  Go Cycle
The  first  adjustment  was  undertaken  in  April  1986  with  the  announcement
of the  Iflexibilization'  phase  of the  program. On  April  4,  there  was  a
devaluation  of the  exchange  rate,  accompanied  by the  introduction  of  a
crawling  peg  system,  and  increases  in  wages  and  prices  of public  sector
15 Two facts  can  be used  to question  the  soundness  of these  increases  in
the money supply.  First, in spite of its size, it did not produce any
significant  reductions  in interest  rates.  Second,  in the fourth  quarter  the
balance  of payments  turned  into deficit  after being in surplus  for the two
previous  quarters,  thus  suggesting  that  at those  interest  rates  there  was  not
an excess  demand  for  money.19
enterprises.16 Despite  the  flexibilization  in  policies,  the  government
continued  to  control  prices  in  the  private  sector,  although  increases  would
be allowed  in the  future  when justified  as  the  result  of  higher  costs.
This  flexibilization  was  necessary  in  view  of  the  persistence  of
inflation,  and the  inability  to  withstand  an overvaluation  of the  domestic
currency. It  was prompted  by the  acceleration  in inflation  in  March  1986  and
by the  continuous  deterioration  in  the  current  account  and  the  budgetary
situation  (see  tables  2  and  3).  The  reduced  access  to foreign  financing,  as
a result  of the  debt  crisis,  imposed  an additional  limit  to the
sustainability  of the  exchange  rate  freeze.
a)  Price  Flexibilization  and  the  Resurgence  of Inflation
The  introduction  of the  April  package  was perceived  as an  acceptance  on
the  part  of the  authorities  that  full  price  stability  was beyond  their  reach
and  that  they  were  now  aiming  at  keeping  inflation  within  reasonable  bounds.
With this  acceptance  there  was  also  an  acceleration  in inflation,  which
reached  6.8  percent  in  July (table  1).
A more  serious  problem  was  the  lack  of a  compreheneive  strategy  to
maintain  inflation  within  reasonable  bounds. The  flexibilization  stage  left
the  system  without  effective  nominal  anchors. The  exchange  rate  and  public
sector  prices  (central  anchors  in  the  initial  packagb)  were  going  to  be
adjusted  according  to  past  inflation  in  order  to  avoid  further  deterioration
in their  relative  prices. In fact,  nominal  increases  in these  two  variables
exceeded  inflation  between  April  and  July. Nominal  wages,  the  third  anchor
in  the initial  program  were increasingly  determined  through  negotiations
16 For  a  more  detailed  discussion  of the  measures  see  de Pablo  (1987).20
between  unions  and  industrialists Since  monetary  policy  continued  to  be
accommodating  there  was  no nominal  variable  in the  system  that  could  provide
an  anchor  for  the  price  level.
In such  a situation  nominal  shocks  have  a destabilizing  effect  on
inflation.  A one  time  increase  in the  price  level  will  be quickly
transmitted  to  wages  and  the  exchange  rate  and  will result  in  a permanent
increase  in the  rate  of inflation. 17
The  main reason  underlying  the  acceleration  in inflation  that  occurred
after  flexibilization  was  and  continues  to  be a controversial  issue. Broadly
speaking,  there  are  three  interpretations  of  this  episode,  one  emphasizing
problems  in  the  behavior  of  nominal  variables,  a second  stressing  the
imbalances  in relative  prices  during  the  initial  freeze,  and  a third
attaching  a larger  weight  to  the  fiscal  and  quasi-fiscal  imbalances.
Frenkel  and  Fanelli  (1987,  p.103)  and  Machinea  and  Fanelli  (1988  p.142)
link  the  acceleration  in  inflation  to  cost-push  factors,  primarily  increases
in  nominal  wages.  The  evolution  of  hourly  wages  during  this  period  is
presented  in  table  1.  As can  be noticed,  hourly  wages  increased  continuously
during  the  first  months  of the  Plan,  while  there  was  a slight  acceleration  in
April. Real  hourly  wages,  however,  had  been  deteriorating  since  the
beginning  of the  plan,  and  the  Poril  and  May increases  were  not  enough  to
restore  their  real  value  to  pre-Austral  levels. The  other  two  major  cost
factors,  the  exchange  rate  and  public  sector  prices,  were  not drastically
increased  in this  period  (see  table  1).  Thus,  the  acceleration  in inflation
17 Adams and Gross  (1986)  provide and  excellent  discussion  of  the
difficulties  of  controlling  inflation  with  exchange  rate  indexation  and  monetary
accommodation.21
between  April  and  June  does  not seem  to  have  been  driven  by  cost  push
factors. 1 8 The story  is somewhat  different  in  July,  where  nominal  increases
probably  had an important  effect  in  the  increases  in inflation. 19 Indeed,
real  wages (as  well  as  hourly  wages)  peaked  in  July  and  were later  eroded  by
further  increases  in  inflation.
Canavese  and  Di Tella  (1988)  on the  other  hand,  consider  that  the
resurgence  of inflation  during  the  flexibilization  period  was due  to the
imbalances  in relative  prices  that  were  built  at the  time  of the  freeze.
They  argue  that Pressures  stemming  from  the  inevitable  need  to realign
prices  troubled  the  Austral  Plan  the  most  and  made  the  unfreezing  essential.
But  at the  same  time  the  end  of the  freeze  had  a troubling  effect  on
inflation,  as it  became  apparent  the  following  year.*  (p.159) If this
argument  is right,  it  implies  that  a period  of  high inflation  will be
followed  by another  period  of low  inflation.  However,  this  argument  fails  to
explain  what  determines  the  rate  of inflation  in the  new  equilibrium.  More
important,  it  does  not  provide  a rational  for  the  acceleration  in  inflation
that  occurred  after  April. 20
18  The  large  increases  in  hourly  wages  in  the  constriction  industry  during
April  could  convey  the  impression  that  cost  push  factors  were  important  in  that
sector. However,  a  more careful  examination  of the  date  indicates  that  wages
in this  sector  did  not experience  almost  any increase  during  the  first  months
of the  Austral. Thus  the  April  increase  basically  restored  relative  wages.
19 The interpretation  of this  complicated  by the fact that  during  this
period  some  labor  unions  obtained  significant  wage increases. The  problem  is
that it is difficult  to assess  the extent  to which these increases  merely
officialized  previous  wage  increases  that  were  already  reflected  in  the  actual
paid (as  opposed  to the  contract)  wages.
20 For  a thorough  evaluation  of this  argument  see  Rodriguez  (1988).22
The  third  interpretation  puts  the  emphasis  on the  continuous  and
excessive  increases  in  the  money  supply  and  the  loosening  of the  budgetary
situation  (see  tables  1 and  2)  during  the  first  quarter  of 1986. In
addition,  the  large  seigniorage  levels  (in  excess  of 3  percent  of  GDP)  on  a
sustainable  basis  were inconsistent  with  the  target  of inflation  in the  low
single  digits. The  April  flexibilization  thus  took  place  in  an expanding
economy  with  high  consumption  and  increasing  budget  imbalances.  Under  these
circumstances,  a resurgence  of inflation  was  all  but inevitable.
The  fiscal  view  can  be used  to  explain  why increases  in inflation  had
to  be expected. The  existence  of relatively  large  budget  deficits  and
seigniorage  level  ranging  between  3  and  4  percent  of  GDP  put  a floor  on
inflation  rates. The sharp  acceleration  in inflation  that  took  place  during
July  and  August,  however,  cannot  be solely  explain  on fiscal  grounds.
A comprehensive  explanation  of inflation  during  this  period  requires  a
combination  of the  ideas  outlined  above. The  large  budget  deficits  and  high
seigniorage  levels  made inflation  unavoidable.  However,  seigniorage  levels
of i  percent  of  GDP  can  be financed  with  a monthly  rate  of inflation  of  5
percent  given  that  Ml was approximately  52  of GDP. The  acceleration  of  July
appears  to  have  been  caused  by additional  factors. Although  cost-push  forces
were probably  important,  they  would  have  been less  destabilizing  if  the
system  had  had  a nominal  anchor.
b) The  first  ipxdng  Plan
The  July  1986  inflation  rate  brought  the  program  to a critical  point;
the  situation  was getting  out  of control  and  urgent  changes  were  needed  to
bring  it  back in  course. A new  team  took  control  of the  central  bank  at the
end  of  August  and  immediately  adopted  a very  tight  stance  regarding23
expansions  in  Ml (table  1).21  Money  was in  practice  the  only  nominal  anchor
in this  program.  The  first  Spring  Plan  did  not  introduce  measures  to  deal
with the  fiscal  imbalances  (since  according  to the  authorities  the  fiscal
situation  was fundamentally  sound)  and  instead  placed  its  emphasis  on the
problems  created  by inertial  forces;  it  established  ceilings  (3  percent)  for
monthly  increases  in  prices  in  the  private  and  public  sectors  as  well  as
limits  on  wage increases.
The  Spring  plan  had  limited  success  in  controlling  inflation,  which
despite  receding,  remained  at relatively  high  levels  for  the  rest  of the
year.  The  underlying  situation  was  not  conducive  for  attaining  price
stability. Despite  tight  money  and  higher  interest  rates  (the  nominal
interest  rate  almost  doubled  in  August),  real  wages,  industrial  production
and  consumption  remained  relatively  high,  although  at somewhat  lower  levels,
and  the  external  situation  continued  to  deteriorate.  While  there  is
disagreement  among  observers  about  the  fiscal  situation  in the  third  quarter
(table  2),  there  is  no question  that  the  fiscal  and  monetary  accounts  greatly
deteriorated  in  the  last  quarter  of 1986.22
The  initial  anchors  were  by then  abandoned,  and  money  remained  as the
only  nominal  anchor. Despite  the  announcements  of limiting  the  devaluations
21  The  drastic  change  in  monetary  policy  adopted  at  that  time  was  necessary
to  insure  the  consistency  of  the  program.  The  discrepancies  between  the  economic
team (led  by Sourrouille)  and  the  central  bank  authorities  (led  by Concepcion)
are  well  documented  in  the  Argentinean  Press  of the  period. At the  same  time,
the  drastic  change  in  monetary  stance  in  August  provides  indirect  evidence  that
the  mismanagement  of  money  supply  was considered,  at least  at some  government
levels,  as one  important  force  behind  the  resurgence  of inflation.
22 For cyclical  reasons  the  budget  deficit  is  usually  larger  in the last
quarter  of  the  year. Nevertheless,  the  incrzase  in  the  deficit  towards  the  end
of  1986  cannot  be fully  explain  by seasonal  factors,  for  one  thing,  it  was  much
larger  than  in the  last  quarter  of 1985.24
and  the  increases  in  public  sectors  prices  to 3  percent  per  month,  they  were
in  effect  indexed,  raising  consistently  by  more than  the  official  guideline.
The  package  relied  almost  entirely  on tight  money,  but  the  sustainability  of
this  strategy  was  very  difficult  to the  extent  that  there  was an
inconsistency  between  the  growth  rates  of  money  and  other  nominal  variables.
c)  Resurgence  of Inflation  and  the  Second  Freeze
Inflation  increased  once  more in  January  1987  and  there  was  an even
larger  increase  in  February. This  rise  in  inflation  was  particularly
troublesome  since  it  took  place  at a time  when  monetary  policy  was  tight  as
measured  by the  growth  of  Ml and  the  high  real  irnterest  rates  or  by the
expansion  of the  monetary  base,  which  contracted  in  January  and  February  (see
figure  2 and  table  1).  Once  again,  the  authorities  resorted  to a price
freeze  in order  to regain  control  over  the  inflationary  process. This  policy
response  indicates  that  the  authorities  were  under  the  impression  that  the
underlying  *fundamentals'  were in  place  and  that  inflation  was  accelerating
as a result  of 'inertial forces. This  interpretation  could  have  been
reinforced  by the  fact  that  inflation  was increasing  at a time  when  monetary
policy  was tight.
Three  remarks  are  useful  for  the  interpretation  of these  events.
First,  although  monetary  policy  remained  tight  during  most of the  Spring
plan,  including  January  and  February,  it  had  been  expansionary  in  the  last
two  months  of-19P6. Second,  there  was an important  fiscal  imbalance  in the
last  quarter  of  1986  which  remained  in  place  in  the  first  quarter  of 1987  and
was likely  to stay  there  for  the  rest  of the  year. The  existence  of a large
fiscal  deficit  made the  stabilization  policy  less  credible  and,  more
importantly,  it threatened  the  sustainability  of tight  money,  which25
eventually  had  to give  in. Third,  firms  may  have  overreacted  in  their  price
adjustments  in  January  and  February  (once  the  price  controls  were  partly
relaxed)  and  increased  their  prices  in excess  of  what  was  warranted  by the
fundamentals'  in  order  to  hold  a cushion  for  the  eventual  imposition  of a
new round  of  price  controls  (to  which  the  authorities  had  already  shown  some
addiction).
Inflation  was  becoming  a  major  liability  for  the  government,  and  the
problem  was  particularly  acute  because  1987  was an  election  year.  Something
had to  be done  in  order  to  deal  with inflation  before  the  situation  got
completely  out  of  control. The  government  response  was  a  new round  of  direct
controls  through  the  introduction  of a  price-exchange  rate  freeze  which  was
supplemented  by a step  adjustment  in  wages  and  public  sector  prices  (to
compensate  for  past  inflation)  followed  by a freeze. Once  again,  no effort
was  made to  provide  a long  term  solution  to the  underlying  fiscal  problem.
The  February  program,  as  most of  the  others,  had  some  transitory  gains
on the  inflation  front,  with inflation  falling  substantially  in  April  and
May. 23 Direct  controls  can  be effective  in  the  short  run. Howevar,  this
time  the success  was  much  shorter  because  the  imbalance  in  the  underlying
fundamental  variables  was complicated  by political  problems  that  eventually
led  to  mismanagement  of rominal  variables.
The  main  political  development  was the  appointment  of Carlos  Alderete,
a  union  leader,  pa minister  of labor  in  April. This  led  very  quickly  to a
change  in  policy,  particularly  regarding  wages,  which  was  announced  on  May 9.
The  new  measures  were the  result  of an agreement  (the  Acuerdo  del  9  de  mayo)
23 There  was  some  reduction  in inflation  in  Harch  as  well,  but  this  is  not
fully  reflected  in the  official  statistics  due  to  methodological  problems.26
between  the  economic  team,  led  by Sourrouille  and  Alderete  and  included
increases  in  wages  and  public  sector  prices,  while  prices  in the  private
sector  would  continue  to be subjected  to government  controls,  but  under  a
more flexible  policy.
d) The  ".wo  Latest  Inflation-Stabilization  Cycles
From  that  time  on,  the  overall  economic  situation  underwent  a steady
deterioration.  Loose  monetary  management,  and  large  budget  deficits  led  to  a
new  acceleration  in inflation,  reaching  13 percent  in  August  and  19.5  percent
in  October,  when the  government  launched  a  new  mini  stabilization  program.
Once  again,  the  acceleration  in inflation  appears  to  have  been  caused  by  a
mixture  of fiscal  imbalances,  and  anticipations  of controls. The increase  in
inflation  prompted  the  imposition  of  price  controls,  making  the  expectations
of their  reimposition  self-fulfilling.
The  October  package  was different  from  the  previous  ones  because  this
time  the  authorities  announced  measures  to  provide  some  longer  term  relief  to
the  fiscal  imbalance  and  to start  a structural  adjustment  process  in  the
economy. Host  of the  reduction  of the  budget  deficit  was going  to take  place
through  increases  in  taxes,  while  there  were  basically  no attempts  to reduce
government  expenditure  of the  central  government.  On the  other  hand,  there
was an announcement  of a firm  commitment  to  privatize  some  public  state
enterprises  and  to start  a  process  of trade  liberalization.
The  outcome  of this  program,  as the  reader  might  expect,  was  a
transitory  reduction  in inflation,  while  the  controls  were in  effect,
followed  by an increase  in inflation  at  a later  stage,  once  the  controls  were
relaxed  (in  January  1988). From  that  time  on,  inflation  continuously
accelerated  reaching  28  percent  in  August  1988.27
The  response  to the  latest  inflationary  outburst  was  the  new  Spring
Plan,  based  on  guidelines  for  increases  in  nominal  variables,  and  reductions
in the  quasi-fiscal  deficit. The  exchange  rate  and  public  sector  prices
recovered  their  role  as  nominal  anchors,  and  their  increases  have  been
preannounced  for  the  next  few  months. Private  sector  wages,  however,  have
been  allowed  to  be freely  determined  through  negotiation  between  firms  and
workers. Tight  money  and  high interest  rates  are  an integral  part  of the
plan.
The  program  has achieved  the  same,  or even  more,  degree  of short  run
success  than  previous  stabilization  efforts. Inflation  fell  substantially.
the  exchange  rate  has  been  stabilized  while  interest  rates  are  high in  real
terms.  Despite  the  greater  discipline  displayed  on the  fiscal  side  and  the
tough  monetary  policy,  its  long  run  success  is still  doubtful. Few
structural  measures  have  been  taken  to  deal  with  the  budget  deficit,  most  of
the  fiscal  adjustment  is  based  on  arrears  and  postponement  of public
investment,  while  it is  difficult  to  believe  that  the  current  real  interest
rates  (exceeding  5 percent  per  month)  can  stay  for  a long  period.
IV.  Evaluation  of the  Recent  Experience
The  macroeconomic  developments  of the  last  three  years  show  quite
clearly  that  the-Austral  plan  did  not succeed  in  bringing  down  inflation  on a
sustained  basis. The  program,  however,  left  useful  lessons  regarding  the
design  of  heterodox  stabilization  programs,  the  difficulties  in sustaining
this  type  of effort,  and  the  consequences  of failure.
a) Early  Developments28
A balanced  evaluation  of this  plan  should  distinguish  between  the
original  strategy  for  stopping  inflation,  with  particular  attention  to the
measures  of  June  1985,  and  the  subsequent  efforts  for  maintaining  price
stability.  The initial  package  was  by and  large  well designed  and
consistent,  and  provided  a sound  first  step  towards  reducing  inflation.  It
was  not  enough,  however,  to  maintain  price  stability  for  a  prolonged  period.
Further  measures  had  to  be taken  in  order  to  consolidate  the  stabilization
effort,  particularly  on the  fiscal  side,  prior  to the  removal  of  controls.
In addition,  the  success  of the  strategy  required  the  authorities  to be ready
to accept  some  costs,  in  terms  of increases  in  unemployment  or at least
postponement  of growth,  if it  the  overall  macroeconomic  cond.tions  made it
necessary.
Fundamental  reforms  of the  fiscal  side  were  necessary  since  the  initial
adjustment  was precarious  and  of a transitory  nature. Nevertheless,  no
drastic  measures  were introduced  to  ensure  permanent  reductions  in  government
expenditure  while  no efforts  were undertaken  to  ensure  that  the  increase  in
revenues  -- largely  resulting  from  transitory  measures--  would  be sustained.
A  fiscal  reform  and  a  restructuring  of public  sector  enterprises  were
imperative,  but  not  undertaken. 2'4
24  A  fisEal  reform  was finally  introduced  in  October  1987,  including  the
introduction  of new taxes  and changes  in the rates  of existing  ones.  This
reform,  however,  was  too little  too late,  while it introduced  additional
distortions  in  the  economy  (i.e.  it  is  likely  to  reduce  financial  intermediation
and  restrict  imports). In  addition,  the  authorities  seem  to  be finally  moving
in  the  direction  of reducing  the  size  of the  public  sector,  and  is involved  in
negotiations  to  privatize  various  public  sector  enterprises.  These  are  welcomed
developments  and hopefully  will be successfully  completed,  however,  as of
November  1988,  very  little  has  been  accomplished.29
A more  difficult  issue,  from  a  policy  perspective,  was  how  to respond
to the  early  recovery  of the  economy  that  started  in  the  fourth  quarter  of
1985. Although  one  of the  objectives  of the  heterodox  package  is to reduce
the  costs  of  bringing  down  inflation,  the  strategy  does  not  call  for  a rapid
expansion  in  output  in  the  early  stages. There  is  no consensus  regarding  the
main reason  behind  the  early  expansion  in  economic  activity. It  might  have
been caused  by a change  in  income  distribution  (the  reduction  in the
inflation  tax  redistributed  income  in  favor  to  wage  earners),  by a relaxation
in  monetary  and  fiscal  policies,  or by an improvement  in  efficiency  as  a
result  of the  sharp  reduction  in  inflation.  Nevertheless,  it is  questionable
whether  this  was  not  a  welcomed  development  at the  early  stages  of a
stabilization  program  in  an  economy  with  widespread  price  controls.
A demand-led  economic  expansion  was a  clear  threat  to  price  stability.
The  policy  choices  were  difficult,  since  most likely  they  required  the
acceptance  of some  of the  costs  that  the  heterodox  package  was intended  to
avoid. Nevertheless,  it is  my  view that  further  fiscal  tightening  and
restrictive  monetary  policy  were  necessary  at the  time  in  order  to compensate
for  the  increase  in  private  sector  demand. It  was advisable  to  pursue  a
policy  of excess  supplies  at least  until  most  prices  were liberalize.
The  lack  of  policy  response  to  the  developments  iu  these  two  areas  were
important  because  they  provided  evidence  on the  way in  which  the  authorities
were  going  to address  potential  problems. In  addition,  with the  benefit  of
hindsight,  it  indicates  that  they  had  not  thought  thoroughly  the  steps  that
would  be necessary  to liberalize  prices  without  bringing  back  inflation.
b)  Removal  of Controls
The  strategy  for  price  liberalization  is a  crucial  aspect  of a30
heterodox  program. Price  stability  can  only  be fully  credible  in  an
environment  of freely  determined  prices. The  overall  scheme  for  liberalizing
prices  is critical  and  needs  as  much  thought  as the  design  of the  initial
phase  of the  program. Particular  attention  should  be given  to  the  timing.
conditions  and  mechanics  of the  removal  of  controls.
It  was  argued  in the  previous  section  that  price  controls  were a
crucial  element  for  stopping  inflation.  Paradoxically,  the  main  advantage  of
controls  is  also  their  main  drawback. The  quick  reduction  in inflation  that
can  be achieved  through  controls  can  make  the  authorities  overconfident  and
lead  them  to  underestimate  the  seriousness  of  any  existing  underlying
imbalances.  In  particular,  it  might  lead  them  to  think  that  no further
measures  are  necessary  to sustain  the  early  gains  against  inflation. In
addition.  since  controls  proved  to  be an  effective  way to  bring  about  price
stability,  the  authorities  might  become  reluctant  to  eliminate  them.  The
process  might  be further  complicated  if  the  freeze  of nominal  anchors  is
extended  beyond  a reasonable  time  and  distortions  in  key  relative  prices
become  apparent. 25 This  is  indeed  a  major  weakness  of the  heterodox
approach.
The  removal  of  controls,  however,  should  be a priority  for  the  program.
Controls  should  be removed  gradually  and  under  a situation  of generalized
excess  supplies. Tight  fiscal  and  monetary  policies  should  remain  in  place
during  the  peLioA  of  price  Iflexibilizationo.  In  Argentina flexibilization
was initiated  at a time  when the  economy  was rapidly  expanding  and  the
25  This is the typical problem observed in the so called populist
stabilization  programs  (e.g.  the  1973-5  Peronist  program,  and  the  recent  Peruvian
one)  where  in  addition  price  controls  are  used  as  a  substitute  for  the  correction
in fundamentals.31
current  account  deficits  were  increasing.  The  public  accounts  had  also  been
deteriorating.  Price  flexibilization  was thus  not  undertaken  under  the  best
circumstances.
A more serious  problem  was that  with the  removal  of controls  the
economy  was left  with no  nominal  anchors. A nominal  anchor  was particularly
important  since  in  the  absence  of controls  prices  and  wages  would  be
determined  by  market  forces. Since  the  exchange  rate,  public  sector  prices
and  the  money  supply  were  basically  adjusted  to  accommodate  inflation,  there
wvas  no nominal  variable  to  anchor  the  rate  of inflation.  Given  the  necessary
adjustments  in  public  sector  prices  and  the  exchange  rate,  money  should  have
played  a  more  active  role  in  this  period,  while  the  authorities  should  have
pursued  a  policy,  from  that  time  on,  of  untying  devaluations  to past
inflation.
An alternative  sequencing  might  have  provided  more  stability  to the
price  level. In the  Austral  plan  the  removal  of controls  coincided  with  the
a  flexibilization  in  the  management  of  the  main  anchors  of the  system. A
gradual  decontrol  of  private  prices  followed  by a sequenced  adjustment  in
wages,  public  sector  prices  and  the  exchange  rate  would  have  had, in  my view,
a better  chance  of success.
c)  The importance  of  Foreign  Debt  and  External  Developments
It is difficult  to assess  the  extent  to  which  the  external  situation
complicated  tbe  ptabilization  effort. An extreme  view is  that  of Canavese
and  Di Tella  (1988)  who consider  that  'repayment  of the  debt  was  the  single
most  important  reason  for  the  relative  failure  of the  plan".  (p.166)
Although  service  of the  external  debt  introduces  an  additional  burden  to the
fiscal  adjustment  (interest  payments  are  approximately  5Z  of GDP),  the32
country  was  able  to get  additional  funds  to cover  more than  half  of these
payments. Actual  net  external  transfers  during  1985-87  were roughly  2Z
percent  of  GDP  per  year.  Thus,  the  fiscal  burden  of interest  payments,  while
important,  does  ,lot  seem  to  have  been  the  critical  problem  for  the  program.
The  debt  problem,  however,  created  other  types  of difficulties  for  the
stabilization  program. First,  it  greatly  complicated  the  reliance  on  the
exchange  rate  as the  main  nominal  anchor  of the  system. In the  absence  of
access  to foreign  borrowing,  the  exchange  rate  would  have to  adjust  if  there
were pressures  on the  external  sector. Second,  and  probably  more important,
it increased  the  uncertainty  about  the  medium  term  sustainability  of the
program. Even if  funds  had  been  provided  in  the  past  to service  the  debt,
there  were questions  as to  whether  those  funds  would  be ready  to  come  in the
future. The  debt issue  also  created  a  problem  regarding  management  of  public
finances,  since  the  government  had  to raise  taxes  in the  future  to continue
servicing  external  debt.
The  external  situation  has  been  complicated  by a significant
deterioration  in the  terms  of  trade  during  the  last  two  years. While  it
would  be unfair  to  attribute  the  failure  of the  program  to  the  service  of the
foreign  debt,  its  burden  and  the  resulting  increase  in  uncertainty  certainly
complicated  the  macro-management  during  this  period. One  thing  is  clear,
external  developments  were  not favorable  for  the  success  of the  program.
d)  Lessons  and  PQlicy  issues
The  Austral  plan,  despite  its  failure,  has left  useful  lessons  for  the
future  design  and  implementation  of stabilization  programs  in  general  and
heterodow  programs  in  particular.  First,  it  has shown  that  stopping
inflation  on  a sustainable  basis  is  essentially  a long  term  effort  which33
requires  persistency  and  discipline.  The  duration  and  scope  of  this  effort
will  be inversely  related  to the  length  of the  inflationary  process,  the
level  of the  rate  of inflation  prior  to  the  program  and  the  number  of
previous  failures. Income  policies  can  be  very  useful  to  bring  down
inflation  quickly,  but  this  short  run  success  needs  to  be accompanied  by a
sustained  fiscal  and  monetary  effort  to  ensure  the  maintenance  of the  price
stability.
Second,  the  Argentine  experience  is  particularly  illuminating  regarding
the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of price  controls. They  were  very  effective
initially  to break  the  inertial  forces  as the  economy  moved  from  high  to low
inflation. It is  unlikely  that  the  rapid  reduction  in inflation  at  the
beginning  of the  program  could  have  been  achieved  in  the  absence  of  price
controls. This,  however,  is an instrument  that  serves  a  very  specific
purpose,  control  of the  inertial  aspects  of the  inflation  process:  to  be
effective,  it  must  be used  cautiously,  and  on a transitory  basis. Controls
should  be gradually  removed  as soon  as the  authorities  perceive  that  the
underlying  inertial  forces  have  been subdued.
One  problem  with  price  controls  is that  they  could  send  a 'wrong*
signal  about  the  success  of  a program. In  most  cases  price  controls  are  an
effective  tool  to  bring  down  inflation,  at least  temp.-arily.  Indeed,  in
Argentina  inflation  came  down  initially  every  time  price  controls  were
introduced.  Unfortunately,  inflation  went  up every  time  they  were removed. 26
Thus,  in  general  it is  very  difficult  to infer  the  underlying  inflation  rate
26  Interestingly  enough,  there  were  no  widespread  shortages  in  any  of  these
cases.  Thus,  the  acceleration  in inflation  following  the  removal  of controls
cannot  be easily  linked  to  the  existence  of  repressed*  inflation  due  to  excess
demand  pressures.34
on the  basis  of the  rate  of inflation  observed  during  a  period  when  controls
are  in effect. An additional  problem  is that  their  short  run  effectiveness
can  lead  the  authorities  to  use  them  each  time  that  inflation  starts  to
accelerate.  This  again  was observed  in  the  recent  Argentine  experience,
where  price  controls  became  the  primary  instrument  to control  inflation.
The  repeated  use  of  controls  quickly  becomes  a tool  that  works  against
any  stabilization  effort. The  inflation  cycles  shown  in figure  2,  are
illustrative  of this  problem. The inflation  outbursts  that  occurred  prior  to
the  actual  imposition  of controls  can  probably  be  best  explain  by
anticipations  by the  private  sector. If firms  expect  a  price  freeze,  they
would  attempt  to enter  the  freeze  with  a  high  absolute  price. Although  this
price  might  be above  the  market  clearing  level  at the  time  of the  freeze,  it
will  be on average  right  while  the  freeze  remains  in  effect. This is  point
of  view appears  to  be supported  by the  behavior  of  prices  during  the  period
under  consideration.  In  Argentina,  price  controls  were  enforced  at the
wholesale  level. As is  apparent  from  table  1,  increases  in  wholesale  prices
were larger  prior  to each  of the  major  freezes  (particularly  in  June  85,
October  87  and  June-August  88),  and  smaller  after  the  freeze. These  larger
increases  prior  to  the  freeze  provided  enough  cushion  to  maintain  a lid  on
price  increases  during  the  period  of controls  and  at least  partly  explains
the  lack  of shortages  during  these  periods.
The inflation-stabilization  cycle  that  has  been  observed  since  June
1985,  was to some  extent  related  to the  stabilization  strategy  followed  by
the  government.  The  fact  that  the  government  revealed  its  decision  of using
price  controls  once,  created  expectations  that  they  could  be used  again  in
the  future. In this  environment,  small  increases  in  inflation  could  very35
quickly  spark  an acceleration  process  in  anticipation  of the  reimposltion  of
controls. The  government  eventually  responds  by imposing  new  controls  making
the  expectations  self  fulfilling.
Despite  their  advantage  for  reducing  inflation  price  controls  can  be
costly  on two  grounds. First,  they  could  be difficult  to remove  and  hence
lead  to distortions  in relative  prices. Second,  and  probably  more important,
a fail  in this  program  could  increase  instability  ln  the  inflation  process.
The  experience  of the  last  few  years  have  made  quite  clear  that  tight
money  cannot  be sustained  in  the  presence  of a large  fiscal  imbalance.  This
of  course  is  well  known  from  Sargent-Wallace  (1981),  and  is  very  clear  from
the  recent  Argentine  experience.  Figure  2 shows  inflation  and  interest  rates
on  deposits  since  the  beginning  of the  Austral  Plan. Tight  money  was used  to
control  inflation  twice;  from  August  86 to  February  87,  and  from  October  87
till  January  88.  In  neither  of these  cases  was the  policy  effective  to
control  inflation  on a  medium  term  basis. As a  matter  of fact,  in  both  cases
inflation  accelerated  during  the  period  in  which  tight  money  was in  effect.
The  Austral  plan  has  added  a  new  chapter  to the  unsuccessful  efforts  to
stopping  inflation.  Despite  the  sophistlcation  of the  original  design  of the
plan  and  the  battery  of follow  up programs,  inflation  is still  alive  and
price  stability  still  appears  as  a distant  proposition.  It seems  that  few
lessons  were learned  from  previous  failures,  as similar  mistakes were
repeated. The  most important  lesson  from  the  Austral  Plan  is that
sophistication  is  not  a substitute  for  addressing  fundamentals  imbalances.
There  is  no substitute  for  persistence  and  continuity  in a stabilization
effort. The  unfortunate  side  is that  each  new  failure  makes  the  path  to
price  stability  more remote  and  more  difficult.36
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Table  2
EXPENDITURES,  REVENUES,  TOTAL FISCAL DEFICIT,  AND SEIGNORAGE
(CASH BASIS, AS % OF GDP)
CENTRAL  ALTERNATIVE
NON FINANICAL PUBLIC SECTOR  BANK  TOTAL  BUDGET
EXPENDITURES  REVENUES  DEFICIT  DEFICIT  DEFICIT  DEFICIT  SEIGNORAG
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
1984  31.2  22.9  9.3  2.7  11.0  12.1
I  32.3  22.8  9.5  5.6  15.1  9.2  9.8
II  33.4  23.1  10 3  6.0  16.3  20.2  9.1
III  29.2  22.9  6.3  3.1  9.4  8.8  8.3
IV  31.5  22.9  9.6  2.3  10.9  10.0  7.9
1985  31.0  27.5  3.5  2.4  5.9  11.4
I  29.5  22.0  7.5  4.4  11.9  12.0  6.0
II  28.9  22.0  6.9  5.0  11.9  23.7  11.5
III  30.4  28.6  1.8  1.2  3.0  5.8  10.0
IV  33.1  31.8  1.3  0.9  2.2  3.9  7.4
1996  28.6  25.9  2.7  1.9  4.6  5.4
i  29.2  26.9  2.3  1.7  1%0  4.3  2.3
II  28.6  27.7  0.9  1.3  2.2  3.6  5.4
III  27.2  26.4  0.8  2.2  3.0  6.8  3.0
IV  29.4  23.7  5.7  2.1  7.8  6.7  5.3
1987  30.7  24.4  6.3  0.9  7.2  7.7
I  28.0  24.2  3.8  1.8  5.6  6.6  2.0
II  32.0  25.5  6.5  1.7  8.2  7.5  4.4
III  29.4  25.0  4.4  1.4  5.8  7.8  2.3
IV  32.1  23.6  8.5  -1.2  7.3  8.7  15.7
(1)  - Includes National  and Provincial  Governments,  Social Security System
and current account deficits of public enterprises.
(2) - Excludes current revenue of public enterprises.
(3)  - Secretary of Treasury  estimation
(4) - Central Bank estimation.  This figure usually differs from the one
obtained by the Treasury  (3).  While the Treasury figure is obtained
with data  "above the line", the Central Bank figure is obtained with
data "bsrow  the line".
(5)  - (3)  . (4)
(6) - Calculated  on the basis of change in public sector debt,
(sources Fudacion Mediterranca).
(7) - Seignorage  - M(t)-M(t-l)/GNP(t)
Sources: Central  Bank of Argentina40
Table 3
ARMENTINA:  RATIONAL  ACCOUNTS  AND THX  BALANCS  07 PAYHrNTS
NATIONAL  ACCOUNTS  BALANCE  OF PAYTiNTS
GNP  CONSUMPTION  INVESTMENT  INDUSTRIAL  CURRENT TRADE  FINANCIAL CHANGE  IN  TERMS  OF
PRODUCTION  ACCOUNT BALANCE SURVICES  RESERVES  TRADE
(MILLION AUSTRALES  1970  PRICES)  (MILLION OF  U.S.  DOLLARS)
1984.1  10212.8  8650.8  928.2  1959.6  -197.0  1294.0  -1351.4  672.6  104.
1984.2  10515.5  8475.8  1391.9  2363.7  -137.5  1350.0  -1448.2  297.8  91.
1984.3  10392.8  8823.6  1226.0  2388.4  -749.6  755.0  -1471.6  -488.3  91.
1964.4  11139.0  9404.9  1681.6  2299.5  -1306.0  124.0  -1440.6  -217.3  112.
1985.1  10102.6  8599.2  1066.1  1893.5  -779.8  626.0  -2.441.1  -266.3  121.
1985.2  10031.1  7755.8  1121.6  2059.3  106.9  1643.0  -1428.5  821.6  107.
1985.3  9481.4  7666.6  843.2  1933.0  109.9  1331.0  -1221.6  1436.6  100.
1965.4  10793.5  9142.3  1151.2  2194.7  -469.8  782.0  -1214.0  523.2  96.
1986.1  10162.7  8568.2  1213.2  1992.1  -603.0  592.0  -1147.0  -435.0  102.
1986.2  10648.3  8606.1  1262.7  2274.6  -456.0  814.0  -1196.0  1441.3  85.
1966.3  10584.6  8919.0  1186.9  2446.0  -508.0  541.0  -934.0  -380.0  86.
1986.4  11198.1  9722.9  1360.0  2406.0  -1092.0  179.0  -1139.0  -1038.0  82.
1967.1 10424.0  906e.7  1062.6  2046.1  -1027.0  241.0  -1042.0  -461.0  66.
1987.2 10696.7  8556.5  1598.9  2386.7  -809.0  362.0  -1157.0  -1368.0  83.
1987.3  10635.7  8861.6S  1446.2  2373.6  -1116.0  -17.0  -1044.0  N/A  85.
.OURCE:  INDICADORES  DE COYUNTURA  AND CENTRAL  BANKFigure  1
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